Self-reference and schizophrenia: A cognitive model of immunity to error through misidentification.

141 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Multiple aspects in the sense of agency (2012, background): “Rather, SA, like SO, is generated at the level of primary sensory-motor processes that involve efferent and afferent processes such as motor (efferent) commands and proprioception, and is manifested at the level of first-order phenomenal consciousness (Gallagher 2000a; 2005; Haggard 2005).”
Phenomenology and Psychopathology (2010, methodology): “The sense of ownership probably depends on sensory feedback mechanisms that are intact in schizophrenia (Gallagher 2000b, 2004a).”
The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness (2006, background): “However, it has be argued (Gallagher 1999) that schizophrenic delusion of control does not prevent the patients from recognizing their actions as their own, but “only” to identify correctly the source of them.”
Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2003, background): “A further set of problems encountered in Frith’s model involves its static nature (Gallagher 2000).”
Self, Solipsism, and Schizophrenic Delusions (2001, background): “Frith’s model seems to us problematic on phenomenological and theoretical grounds (see Gal- lagher 2000, for a detailed critique).”