On generalized Nash games and variational inequalities
By Francisco Facchinei, A. Fischer, Veronica Piccialli. Operations Research Letters, 2007
368 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Computational Theory and Mathematics, Economics and Econometrics, Numerical Analysis
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b3e43594bddb42d4fe91145a92e4eb1d1b5a8c42
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The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Computational Theory and Mathematics
- D. P. Palomar
- Jong-Shi Pang
- Gesualdo Scutari
- Francisco Facchinei
- Samuel A. Burden
- Lillian J. Ratliff
- S. Sastry
- Masao Fukushima
In Economics and Econometrics
In Numerical Analysis
- D. P. Palomar
- Gesualdo Scutari
- Jong-Shi Pang
- Francisco Facchinei
- S. Sastry
- Dang Van Hieu
- Masao Fukushima
- Yura Malitsky
Citations in the corpus
- On the Characterization of Local Nash Equilibria in Continuous Games (2014, background): “Adding constraints led to extensions of nonlinear programming concepts, such as constraint qualification conditions, to games with generalized Nash equilibria [6]–[8].”
- Convex Optimization, Game Theory, and Variational Inequality Theory (2010, background): “It can be seen that every solution of this VI is a solution of GNEP with shared constraints, but not vice versa [34], [4]; the numerical example below illustrates this fact.”