Determinants of Dividend Smoothing: Empirical Evidence

By Mark T. Leary, Roni Michaely. 2011

400 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/265f829fc213dcd2591fa89acac992f12d87dda1

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Citations in the corpus

The impact of board gender composition on dividend payouts (2017, background): “Z includes controls that account for the impact of firm characteristics on the dividend payout, following Leary and Michaely (2011) and Harford et al. (2008).”
A Lintner Model of Payout and Managerial Rents (2012, positive): “This theory could accommodate smoothing if the dividing line between high- and low-dividend payers is stable.9 The surveys by Allen and Michaely (2003) and Leary and Michaely (2011) conclude that dividend policy is better explained by agency problems than by signaling.”
Quantile cointegration in the autoregressive distributed-lag modeling framework (2015, methodology): “With the new survey evidence in mind, Leary and Michaely (2011) address an important issue of why firms smooth dividends by studying the cross-sectional differences in the behavior of dividend smoothing.”
Payout Policy Through the Financial Crisis: The Growth of Repurchases and the Resilience of Dividends (2015, neutral): “According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), absent taxes and other frictions, dividends should be a matter of indifference to investors and firms.”
Dynamic panels with threshold effect and endogeneity (2016, positive): “…we find that dividend smoothing is relatively stronger for firms that tend to pay the higher (target) dividend payout especially in the long-term perspective, a finding generally consistent with the survey evidence in Brav et al. (2005) and the micro empirical evidence in Leary and Michaely (2011).”
Financial Flexibility, Risk Management, and Payout Choice (2014, background): “However, asymmetric information, managerial risk aversion and costs of financial distress, among other frictions, generate benefits to hedging, as discussed in prior literature, such as Smith and Stulz (1985), Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993), and Minton and Schrand (1999). Empirically, it is clear”