Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence

By IV John C. Coates. 2001

157 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/264b00d22b2ee1031d7095b1256679879c4891db

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Citations in the corpus

Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners (2016, background): “Likewise, the value implication of removing poison pills and other takeover defenses is debatable (e.g., Stein, 1988; Coates, 2000).”
Corporate Governance, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Information Flow (2007, unknown): “Third, fewer takeover restrictions could indicate that the management/board would have limited bargaining power should a control offer occur [Comment and Schwert (1995) and Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2002)], thereby interesting speculators who would prefer to tender into an offer.2 The probab”
Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited (2013, unknown): “This is because boards can implement a poison pill plan at any point in time, even after a hostile bid has been launched without the need for shareholder approval, such that all firms in effect have a “shadow poison pill” (Coates, 2000).”
Shock-Based Causal Inference in Corporate Finance and Accounting Research (2015, background): “…might also have run a horse-race between different antitakeover laws, and between these laws and firms’ ability to adopt poison pills.74 Their failure to do so looms large given the criticism of studies of antitakeover laws by legal scholars, notably Coates (2000) and Catan and Kahan (2016).”
Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control (2008, unknown): “Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2002) suggest that the election of a single slate of directors proposed by a hostile bidder is equivalent to a successful shareholder referendum on the bid.”
The Disappearing Delaware Effect (2004, background): “, indemnification provisions); and still others, such as poison pills, are irrelevant ex ante for most public companies (Coates 2000).”
How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2013, unknown): “Event studies focusing on governance changes adopted by companies bundle together the mar-ket’s assessment of the changes with the market’s inferences concerning private information that might have led management to make such changes (e.g., Binder, 1985; Coates, 2000).”
Framing Controversial Actions: Regulatory Focus, Source Credibility, and Stock Market Reaction to Poison Pill Adoption (2014, background): “Poison pills have been controversial since their inception because while management, lawyers, and legislators have generally been in their favor, investors in particular have been concerned about the potential of an agency problem (Coates, 2000).”