Favoritism in Mutual Fund Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross-Fund Subsidization

By F. T. Magiera. 2006

518 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2593c0245d33fc7ff6dbac439d06e22c287e5d11

Citations in the corpus

• Incentives and Mutual Fund Performance: Higher Performance or Just Higher Risk Taking? (2009, unknown): “(1993), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Carhart (1997), and Bollen and Busse (2005) show evidence of short-term persistence in the performance of mutual funds.”
• Mutual Funds and Bubbles: The Surprising Role of Contractual Incentives (2008, unknown): “Evidence of fund herding is abundant [Grinblatt et al. (1995); Wermers (1999)]. At the same time, the natural tendency to herd can be contrasted by the way compensation is structured. ‘‘Managers who care only about their reputation will always herd . . . but managers who care about profits [‘compens”
• Mutual Fund Competition, Managerial Skill, and Alpha Persistence (2018, unknown): “For instance, while Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) find supporting evidence, Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2012) report a positive relation between size and alpha.”
• Portfolio Manager Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry (2019, unknown): “…and is arguably more likely to engage in cross-clientele subsidization Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2024027 3 (e.g., Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006)); (ii) the advisor is affiliated with a bank or a broker-dealer and hence is more prone to make decisions that…”
• Unobserved Actions of Mutual Funds (2008, unknown): “One specific way of how fund families can favor particular funds is by allocating underpriced IPO purchases to a group of particular funds (Reuter, 2004; Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 2004).”
• Conflicting Family Values in Mutual Fund Families (2013, unknown): “We also repeat the analyses for fund fees, as fees are an alternative criterion for highvalue funds in Gaspar et al. (2006). We sort funds into fee deciles and find that liquidity provision is prevalent in all fee deciles, although the highest fee decile features the largest coefficient estimate.”
• Information flows within financial conglomerates: Evidence from the banks–mutual funds relation (2008, unknown): “This test, similar to the ones employed by Chevalier (2000) and Gaspar et al. (2004), allows us to see whether the effect on performance is indeed a phenomenon related to group affiliation as opposed to a mere statistical artifact.”