Information flows within financial conglomerates: Evidence from the banks–mutual funds relation
By Massimo Massa, Zahid Rehman. 2008
247 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e396d13a791a36e106fd9e7506713c2534ea77a4
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Veronika K. Pool
- Jung Hoon Lee
- Massimo Massa
- Utpal Bhattacharya
- N. Dass
- Miguel A. Ferreira
- Arturo Bris
In Finance
- Veronika K. Pool
- Jung Hoon Lee
- Massimo Massa
- Utpal Bhattacharya
- N. Dass
- Miguel A. Ferreira
- Arturo Bris
Citations in the corpus
- Institutional Stock Trading on Loan Market Information (2011, unknown): “We also add to the findings of Massa and Rehman (2008), who examine stock trading by mutual funds that belong to bank families, by identifying the channel of information transmission between the loan and equity markets (although our prime focus is the broad phenomenon of direct institutional…”
- The Impact of a Strong Bank-Firm Relationship on the Borrowing Firm (2011, background): “…banks are often part of bigger financial conglomerates, with affiliated investment arms, such as investment banks, mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies, that can trade on the basis of the information acquired through lending (Acharya and Johnson 2007; Massa and Rehman 2008).”
- Conflicting Family Values in Mutual Fund Families (2013, background): “Zhang (2009) and Chen, Hanson, Hong, and Stein (2008) investigate whether mutual and hedge funds prey on liquidity strapped mutual funds, respectively. They find that they do, and they find that this preying is profitable. Finally, since the cost of redemptions is borne by the remaining shareholders”
- The role of institutional investors in propagating the crisis of 2007-2008. (2012, unknown): “8 Shleifer and Vishny (2010), Gorton and Metrick (this issue), and others describe the so-called ‘‘shadow banking system,’’ where brokerdealer banks actively supported the liquidity of securitized bonds by acting as market makers, while, at the same time, they funded their own balance sheets in the ”
- Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market for Corporate Control (2009, unknown): “8 Massa and Rehman (2005) show that mutual funds use the inside information available to the affiliated banks lending to firms around the time the loan is granted.”