Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception
By J. Prinz. 2006
108 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d30cf5377d74a2cc4c7e571c4b7e93e85194722c
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Tom Froese
- Xabier E. Barandiaran
- Helena De Preester
- Péter Zoltán Baranyi
- Tom Ziemke
- Á. Csapó
- Yuri Lenon Barbosa Nogueira
- Zoltán Petres
Citations in the corpus
- Autonomy and Enactivism: Towards a Theory of Sensorimotor Autonomous Agency (2017, background): “…depends on motor movement), or the way in which perception is action dependent, what drives the attention of sensorimotor enactivism is the structure of the environment as enacted by a particular type of embodiment (Block 2005; Lenay and Steiner 2010; Noë 2004; Prinz 2006; Rowlands 2009a).”
- Technology and the Body: the (Im)Possibilities of Re-embodiment (2011, background): “The opposite view (e.g. Prinz 2006) says that the experience remains tactile.”
- Definition and synergies of cognitive infocommunications (2012, background): “Others have argued the opposite, maintaining that the new, substituting modality dominates the substituted modality, and that the stimuli should be regarded as generating percepts in the substituting modality (this is known as the dominance thesis , e.g. as in [30]).”
- Enactive artificial intelligence: Investigating the systemic organization of life and mind (2009, background): “…have had the unfortunate effect that the notion of ‘enaction’ has for many researchers become almost exclusively associated with Noë’s and O’Regan’s work on the sensorimotor approach to perception, and often their work has been explicitly criticized under this label (e.g. Prinz 2006; Velmans 2007).”