Differential properties in the ratings of certified versus non-certified bond-rating agencies

By W. H. Beaver, C. Shakespeare, Mark T. Soliman. 2006

313 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/250351aec7636eff62b983a9b66bf074f91b9980

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Pepa Kraft
2. L. Lee
3. Monica Neamtiu
4. Philip G. Berger
5. David Dranove
6. G. Jin
7. Mei Cheng
8. Christian Leuz

In Finance

1. L. Lee
2. Monica Neamtiu
3. Pepa Kraft
4. Philip G. Berger
5. David Dranove
6. G. Jin
7. Mei Cheng

Citations in the corpus

• Fair Value Accounting for Financial Instruments: Does It Improve the Association Between Bank Leverage and Credit Risk? (2013, unknown): “20 Beaver et al. (2006) also include a variable that indicates that the issue has credit enhancements in their model.”
• Challenges and opportunities in disclosure research—A discussion of 'the financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature' $ (2011, background): “Bens et al. (2011) expand on this line of reasoning as follows.”
• Does It Matter Who Pays for Bond Ratings? Historical Evidence (2010, unknown): “As Beaver et al. (2006) argue, the regulatory use of ratings from NRSRO has caused S&P’s ratings to serve different purposes than those of EJR and led to the ratings that have very different attributes.”
• An empirical analysis of changes in credit rating properties: Timeliness, accuracy and volatility (2009, background): “We focus on these three rating properties, because prior academic literature (Altman and Rijken, 2004; Loffler, 2004; Beaver et al., 2006) and the credit rating agencies (Cantor and Mann, 2003) identify them as being important to credit rating users.”
• Do Rating Agencies Cater? Evidence from Rating-Based Contracts (2015, unknown): “A large proportion of bond investors such as mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies use ratings by certified rating agencies to comply with rating-based regulation (Beaver et al. (2006), Partnoy (1999), SEC (2003)).7 To comply with regulations, investors desire high ratings.”
• Rating Agency Adjustments to GAAP Financial Statements and Their Effect on Ratings and Credit Spreads (2015, background): “Thus SEC-certified rating agencies act as quasi-regulators and are subject to an asymmetric loss function (Beaver et al. (2006)).”
• Credit Rating Agencies in Capital Markets: A Review of Research Evidence on Selected Criticisms of the Agencies (2007, unknown): “incentives. Beaver, Shakespeare, and Soliman [2005] predict that Moody’s ratings and practices”
• Incentives to Inflate Reported Cash from Operations Using Classification and Timing (2012, background): “…that senior executives at the major bond rating agencies consider the CFO to long-term debt ratio is a key variable in their decision process.14 Beaver, Shakespeare, and Soliman (2006) argue that the investment grade and non-investment grade boundary is a critical point in the distribution of…”
• Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice (2010, background): “…showing that the market responds more to bad news than to good news.26 Such asymmetric response may explain why some credit rating agencies are reluctant to downgrade (Beaver, Shakespeare, and Soliman, 2006) and why firms tend to announce bad news on late Friday (Della Vigna and Pollet 2009).”