The Core of an N Person Game
By H. Scarf. 1967
How researchers see this paper
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- Shao Chin Sung
- Brandon Fain
- Dinko Dimitrov
- Kamesh Munagala
- David F. Manlove
- Nisarg Shah
- Matthew O. Jackson
- Ashish Goel
Citations in the corpus
- Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey (2002, methodology): “In particular, an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium allocation belongs to the ex ante core of the Arrow–Debreu economy; both sets are non-empty under standard assumptions; as in Debreu and Scarf (1963), the set of allocations that remain in the core with replication converges to the set of Arrow–Debreu alloc”
- Introduction to Numerical Continuation Methods (1987, methodology): “Meanwhile, Scarf (1967) gave a numerically implementable proof of the Brouwer fixed point theorem, based upon a complementary pivoting algorithm of Lemke & Howson (1964) and Lemke (1965).”
- Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2013, methodology): “Aharoni and Fleiner [33] used a game-theoretic result of Scarf [521] to independently prove the existence of a stable half-matching for an instance of sri.”
- On Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games (2007, background): “Scarf, 1967 ) to the ordinal context of hedonic games.”
- The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem (2016, methodology): “This notion is borrowed from cooperative game theory and was first phrased in game theoretic terms in [29].”
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Public Goods (2018, methodology): “Below, we define the notion of core outcomes , which has been extensively studied (in similar forms) as a notion of stability in economics [13, 34, 26] and computer science [23, 11] in the context of randomized or fractional allocations.”
- Coherent allocation of risk capital (2001, background): “Theorem 1 (Bondareva-Shapley, [6], [14]) A coalitional game with transferable costs has a nonempty core if and only if it is balanced.”
- Games played through agents (2003, background): “Scarf [16]) because of the distinction in our game between principals and agents.”
- The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2002, background): “Ordinal Balance The rst condition builds directly on a theorem of Scarf (1967).”
- Economic Impact of Tourism on Fiji's Economy: Empirical Evidence from the Computable General Equilibrium Model (2004, background): “Theoretical general equilibrium analysis received greater attention from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, and is associated with the contributions of Arrow and Debrou (1954), Debreu (1959), Scarf (1967, 1973) and Arrow and Hahn (1971).”