Contemporary science and natural explanation : commonsense conceptions of causality

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Explaining Explanations in AI (2018, background): “Further, to be informative, explanations should not be entirely reducible to presuppositions, or beliefs that the recipient of the explanation already holds (Hesslow, 1988).”
The Role of Mechanism Beliefs in Causal Reasoning (2000, background): “Ultimately, this process would be bottomed out to the point where objects must have their causal powers "essentially" with no other more basic process responsible (Harré, 1988).”
Prompting Contrastive Explanations for Commonsense Reasoning Tasks (2021, background): “It explains why some fact P occurred instead of some foil Q, where Q can be implicit (Hesslow, 1988; Lipton, 1990; Miller, 2019).”
Conversational processes and causal explanation. (1990, methodology): “However, in terms of the present approach they would be better termed as describing the cases of multiple necessary conditions and multiple sufficient causes (cf. Hilton, 1988).”
Judgment dissociation theory: an analysis of differences in causal, counterfactual, and covariational reasoning. (2003, methodology): “The causepresent information is required to compute the probability of the outcome given the proposed cause, P(B|A), which is regarded as a probabilistic measure of the sufficiency relation A ʛ B (e.g., Hilton, 1988; Suppes, 1970).”