Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations
By Kofi O. Nti. 2004
121 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/245946a7518aafe30f2f49a741aa5d8f51280ca4
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Citations in the corpus
- Contest functions : theoretical foundations and issues in estimation (2013, background): “…v1 so that: p1 e1; e2ð Þ ¼ 1 if e1≥v1 and e1 > e2; 1 2 if e1 ¼ e2≥v1; 0 if e1 < v1: 8>< >: Franke et al. (2009) also assume that the objective of the contest designer is to solely maximize aggregate effort (∑i ei) and extend Nti (2004) to allow for n≥2 potentially heterogenous contestants.”
- Political Culture and Discrimination in Contests (2011, background): “3 Glazer and Hassin (1988), Moldovanu and Sela (2001) and Nti (2004) deal with the contest prize, Baye et al. (1993), Amegashie (2000) and Taylor (1995) focus on the set of contestants, Gradstein (1998), Gradstein and Konrad (1999) and Amegashie (2000) examine the structure of multi-stage contests,…”
- Generalized contest success functions (2009, unknown): “This is precisely the CSF used by Nti (2004).”