Generalized contest success functions
By Birendra Rai, Rajiv Sarin. 2009
80 citations recorded by the source corpus.
The key element of models of contest is the contest success function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizations to the case where each agent can have multiple types of investments. This allows us to provide a unified framework to extend and interpret the results of Skaperdas (Econ Theory 7:283–290, 1996) and Clark and Riis (Econ Theory 11:201–204, 1998), and rationalize some seemingly ad hoc CSFs used by applied researchers.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e34e67cbe4862d15842d222630383ff5c6ea82ad
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Citations in the corpus
- The market for protection and the origin of the state (2010, unknown): “5 We should mention that the function p(x) could take a probabilistic interpretation, denoting the probability of the peasant prevailing in a conflictual encounter with a bandit (such a function can be justified axiomatically or in other ways as in Hirshleifer (1989); Skaperdas (1996); Clark and Rii”
- Contest functions : theoretical foundations and issues in estimation (2013, background): “Rai and Sarin (2009) have provided more general axiomatizations of this that also allow for the function f(∙) to be one of many inputs and not just of effort (which we have assumed, in general, to be of other inputs as well).”