Tax, financial reporting, and tunneling incentives for income shifting: An empirical analysis of the transfer pricing behavior of Chinese-listed companies

By Agnes W. Y. Lo, Raymond M. K. Wong, Michael Firth. 2010

126 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/23e6f32c7a3c4f898058aeee67c747992cab058c

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Yuan George Shan
2. Agnes W. Y. Lo
3. Raymond M. K. Wong
4. Michael Firth
5. Gary Gang Tian
6. Xiaofei Pan
7. Wenxuan Hou
8. Oliver M. Rui

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Michael Firth
2. Yuan George Shan

Citations in the corpus

• Value relevance, earnings management and corporate governance in China (2015, background): “…concludes that related-party transactions arewidely used to manipulate earnings for financial reporting (Aharony et al., 2010b; Jian and Wong, 2010; Lo et al., 2010a; Wong et al., 2015), and good corporate governance mechanisms could moderate the level of tunneling in China (Gao and Kling, 2008;…”
• Can corporate governance deter management from manipulating earnings? Evidence from related-party sales transactions in China (2010, background): “Management may have a strong financial reporting incentive to shift income inward to maximize their performance-linked bonuses or to avoid losses (Lo et al., 2007).”