State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective

By M. Edin. The China Quarterly, 2003

651 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/23886571e9be289819c19dc35083b931d3996a36

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Citations in the corpus

“Building a New Socialist Countryside” – Only a Political Slogan? (2009, positive): “Project evaluation (xiangmu kaohe) and cadre evaluation (ganbu kaohe) are inseparable from the process of policy implementation in China (see e.g. Edin 2003a and 2003b; Whiting 2004; Heimer 2006; Zhao 2006).”
The Chinese Paradox of High Growth and Low Quality of Government: The Cadre Organization Meets Max Weber (2015, positive): “This is a system in which performance goals and hierarchically ordered mandates are set centrally giving local cadres fairly large discretionary power over how to reach the targets—what Edin (2003, 36) labels “institutional adaptability.””
The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China's Great Leap Famine (2010, neutral): “With a goal of a more generalizable account, we seek clues from a literature that emphasizes the importance of cadre incentives in shaping China’s reform process (Bo 1996; Edin 2003; Guo 2009; Landry 2008; Li and Walder 2001; Li and Zhou 2005; Manion 1985; Oi 1992; Xu n.d.; Walder 1995).”
Show Me the Money: Interjurisdiction Political Competition and Fiscal Extraction in China (2014, background): “However, scholars agree that political appointments are an important mechanism by which upper level governments can control local policy implementation (Edin 2003; Huang 1996; Landry 2008; Xu 2011).”
Dilemmas of Local Governance under the Development Zone Fever in China: A Case Study of the Suzhou Region (2008, background): “Edin (2003) also argues that the higher levels of the party/state have improved monitoring and have strengthened political control over lower-level local leaders since 2000.”
Performance Management, High-Powered Incentives, and Environmental Policies in China (2015, background): “In particular, ‘‘[w]hile completion of hard targets is important both for bonus and for political rewards, completion of priority targets (with veto power) constitutes the basis for personnel decisions’’ (Edin 2003b, 39).”
Decentralization and Veiled Corruption Under China's 'Rule of Mandates' (2013, background): “If a township fails to meet targets with veto power by the end-ofthe-year evaluation, the failure would eliminate all credit to township leaders for other successes achieved that year (Edin, 2003).”
Fiscal decentralization, political centralization, and land urbanization in China (2016, background): “Therefore, higher levels of the Party have improved monitoring and have strengthened political control over lower-level local leaders in China since 2000 (Edin, 2003).”