Does Competition Encourage Credit Provision? Evidence from African Trade Credit Relationships

By Raymond J. Fisman, M. Raturi. Review of Economics and Statistics, 2004

241 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2224eab15c0b1b55c10d22f1e3e69b74484f8ebc

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Citations in the corpus

Trade Credit Contracts (2010, unknown): “It has been argued that trade credit provides a way for a supplier to engage in price discrimination, giving favored or more powerful clients longer terms (see, e.g.,Wilner 2000; Fisman and Raturi 2004; Van Horen 2005; Giannetti et al. 2011).”
Bargaining power and trade credit (2016, background): “Fisman and Raturi (2004) obtain this prediction in a setting where customers have to take specific up-front investments to establish their creditworthiness for the credit to be provided.”
Trade credit and supplier competition (2019, background): “Fisman and Raturi (2004) argue that a customer of a monopolistic supplier does not have incentives to invest”
What Have We Learned from a Decade of Manufacturing Enterprise Surveys in Africa? (2005, unknown): “Fisman and Raturi (2004) investigate if various firm and entrepreneurial characteristics affect the likelihood that firms in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe get trade credit.”
Trade Credit, Relationship-specific Investment, and Product Market Power (2015, background): “Tests using these firm-level data show that the TC received by a firm (AP) is positively related with the RSI of its supplier firm.”
Firms as liquidity providers: Evidence from the 2007–2008 financial crisis (2013, background): “…provides a mechanism for clients to certify the quality of the good (Smith (1987), Lee and Stowe (1993) and Long, Malitz and Ravid (1993)), or because it gives them a competitive edge over other suppliers (Fisman and Raturi (2004), Fabbri and Klapper (2008); see Cuñat and Garcia-Appendini (2011)).”
Socially responsible corporate customers (2020, background): “…a supplier would have stronger 3 bargaining power when it extends little trade credit to its principal customers (Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim, 2008; Fisman and Raturi, 2004; and Burkart, Ellingsen, and Giannetti, 2009), or when its sales do not depend on its relationship with a specific customer…”