Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience

By Carl F. Craver. 2007

1,158 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/21c8d72b04c335d101375980ad09bbdaee3d93cd

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Citations in the corpus

Deconstructing the seductive allure of neuroscience explanations (2015, neutral): “Finally, it possible that neuroscience seduces because of a general preference for reductive explanations (Craver, 2007; Garﬁnkel, 1981; Trout, 2007).”
General theories of explanation: buyer beware (2013, positive): “Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly common to be even more modest than this, by discussing only a special class of explanation within a particular discipline, e.g. asymptotic explanations in theoretical physics (Batterman 2002) or constitutive explanations in neuroscience (Craver 2007).”
Integrating explanation and prediction in computational social science (2021, background): “…of new theories 12,84 that are either more predictively accurate or that generalize to a broader set of circumstances. the subjective experience of having made sense of many diverse phenomena without being either predictively accurate or demonstrably causal 81 (for example, conspiracy theories).”
Neuroscience and the Multiple Realization of Cognitive Functions* (2010, background): “The multilevel nature of neuroscientific explanation (see, e.g., Craver 2007; Aizawa and Gillett 2009) strongly implies that at least some realizer properties will be instantiated by components of entities with realized properties (e.g., properties and relations of components of a brain area may in…”
Understanding and misunderstanding randomized controlled trials (2016, neutral): “(See also Bechtel (2006), Craver (2007)).”
A Manifesto for a Processual Philosophy of Biology (2018, background): “…of phenomena has led to an explosion of interest in the philosophy of science as a growing number of philosophers have tried to come to terms with the nature and scope of so-called mechanistic explanations (e.g. Machamer et al. 2000; Glennan 2002; Bechtel 2006; Craver 2007; Craver and Darden 2013).”
Neuroscience Needs Behavior: Correcting a Reductionist Bias. (2017, neutral): “The italicized word is known as a filler term, which indicates the lack of an explicit conceptual framework for the mapping between circuit and behavior (Craver, 2008) and so just fills in for it (Figure 3).”
Everything Flows : Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology (2018, background): “…phenomena has led to an explosion of interest in the philosophy of science, as a growing number of philosophers have tried to come to terms with the nature and scope of so-called mechanistic explanations (e.g. Machamer et al. 2000; Glennan 2002; Bechtel 2006; Craver 2007; Craver and Darden 2013).”
Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches (2011, background): “Furthermore, many argue that explanations at different mechanistic levels directly constrain one another (Bechtel and Mundale 1999, P.S. Churchland 1986, Craver 2007, Feest 2003, Keeley 2000, Shapiro 2004).”