An Economic Theory of Clubs

By J. M. Buchanan. 1965

How researchers see this paper

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Toward Trustworthy AI Development: Mechanisms for Supporting Verifiable Claims (2020, background): “Voluntary membership organizations with stricter rules and norms have been implemented in other industries and might also be a useful model for AI developers [31].”
Property Rights and the Public Realm: Gates, Green Belts, and Gemeinschaft (2002, methodology): “In the appendix, a model is developed, following Buchanan (1965), which defines the conditions for Pareto-efficient allocations of private, club, and urban realms.”
Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action (2001, background): “A good example of this is James Morrow’s (1991) autonomysecurity trade-off as the large allies provide the security for the small allies in return for their support on political issues.”
Voluntary Environmental Programs: A Comparative Perspective. (2012, background): “It is therefore important to examine the elasticity of recruitment into VEPs in relation to the stringency of their obligation, to help the debate on whether stringent VEPs always constitute better public policy, and what is the optimal club size (Buchanan, 1965) of VEP from a welfare perspective.”
A review of the value of aggregators in electricity systems (2017, unknown): “the aggregator’s services are non-rivalrous) [18].”