Property Rights and the Public Realm: Gates, Green Belts, and Gemeinschaft

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Homeowners Associations, Collective Action and the Costs of Private Governance (2005, background): “Buchanan’s club theory can be applied to non-entrepreneurial urban clubs (see for example, Heikkila, 1996; Webster, 2002, 2003; Webster & Lai, 2003) but should in that case be taken as complementary to Olson’s analysis.”
Rediscovering the ‘Gate’ Under Market Transition: From Work-unit Compounds to Commodity Housing Enclaves (2005, unknown): “…should increase in quantity and quality”, because “households are willing to pay when they move from a traditional neighbourhood to a proprietary neighbourhood”, and thus “in this sense they must be seen as an efficient club institution from the point of view of residents” (Webster, 2002, p. 409).”
Some Reflections on the Economic and Political Organisation of Private Neighbourhoods (2005, background): “Formalised institutions organise the property rights in these club economies and therefore enable a more efficient (private market) supply of local public goods as in heterogeneous and bigger municipalities where there are no such direct and formalised arrangements (Webster, 2002, p. 409).”