Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and its Relation to Aggressive Financial Reporting

By M. Frank, Luann J. Lynch, Sonja O. Rego. 2009

1,459 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1edf473ea21b4857446e06299ed31b39b7a70ebf

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Citations in the corpus

Can Book-Tax Differences Capture Earnings Management and Tax Management? Empirical Evidence from China (2011, positive): “Current studies indicate that firms engaged in aggressive book reporting may be also involved in aggressive tax reporting (Frank et al., 2009).”
The Effect of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Tax Avoidance (2012, methodology): “…3 To avoid the complexity of determining the legality or appropriateness of the mechanism used to reduce the tax burden, we follow the literature (e.g., Chen et al. 2010; Frank et al. 2009; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) and define tax avoidance as a broad…”
Customer-Supplier Relationships and Corporate Tax Avoidance (2017, background): “Abnormal accruals are included to control the potential effect of earnings management on book-tax differences (e.g., Frank, Lynch, and Rego 2009).”
Incentives for Tax Planning and Avoidance: Evidence from the Field (2014, methodology): “We employ regression analysis to examine the effect of ‘harm to firm reputation’ (i.e., the rating from our survey data) on firms’ tax planning behavior as measured by their 3-Yr Cash ETRs , P(Tax Shelter) , DTAX (from Frank, Lynch, and Rego 2009), and the firm’s”
A review of tax research (2010, positive): “The measure developed by Frank et al. (2009) has been used in subsequent papers and thus, similar to our earlier discussion of the long-run cash ETR from Dyreng et al. (2008), we discuss the measure in some detail to be clear on the types of questions that the measure can and cannot address.”
The Incentives for Tax Planning (2012, methodology): “Frank et al. (2009) compute DTAX as the residuals from a regression of an estimate of perm diffs on measures of intangible assets, income of unconsolidated subsidiaries, minority interest, state tax burdens, changes in NOLs, and lagged perm diffs.”
Religiosity and Tax Avoidance (2013, methodology): “…that tax avoidance in influenced by corporate attributes such as profitability, intangible assets, R&D spending, the extent of foreign operations, leverage and aggressiveness in financial reporting (e.g., Frank et al. 2009; Graham and Tucker 2006; Gupta and Newberry 1997; Rego 2003; Wilson 2009).”
Tax Avoidance and Ex Ante Cost of Capital (2017, positive): “Because financialreporting quality and tax-reporting quality are positively correlated (e.g., Frank et al. 2009), we orthogonalize our measure of accrual quality from our measures of tax avoidance by estimating the following regression model: AQi,t = + 1 BTDi,t + 2 CETRi,t + 3 GAAPETRi,t +…”
Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness (2013, neutral): “We control for abnormal accruals because Frank et al. (2009) find a positive association between financial and tax reporting aggressiveness.”