You Can’t Save Alone: Commitment in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations in Kenya

By Mary Kay Gugerty. Economic development and cultural change, 2007

375 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1e03e958c556ea701074731e15bba5142f234fe4

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Citations in the corpus

Access to Finance (2010, positive): “Many theories exist to explain the presence and structure of rotating savings and credit organizations (ROSCAs), but one commonly held belief is that they provide a form of commitment from your future self (Gugerty, 2007) or from your spouse or extended family (Anderson and Baland, 2002). In Gugerty”
Poverty and Self-Control (2013, background): “Aliber (2001), Gugerty (2007) and Anderson and Baland (2002) view ROSCA participation as a commitment device; see also the theoretical contributions of Ambec and Treich (2007) and Basu (2011).”
Promising approaches to address the needs of poor female farmers (2010, background): “Indeed, the literature on household savings, and on informal savings devices in particular, has emphasized impacts from spousal or familial-control explanations (Anderson and Baland 2002; Gugerty 2007).”
Rural Women’s Access to Financial Services: Credit, Savings, and Insurance (2014, background): “Anderson and Balland (2002) and Gugerty (2007) hypothesize that one of the reasons for the high level of female participation in rotating credit and savings associations (ROSCAs) is that this socially accepted strategy to save allows women to protect their savings from husbands and other relatives.”
Psychological characteristics and household savings behavior: The importance of accounting for latent heterogeneity (2018, background): “Ashraf et al. (2006) support the notion that goals can act as commitment devices, while Gugerty (2007) discusses how commitment devices might be especially valuable for the savings behavior of the less affluent.”
Why Don’t the Poor Save More? Evidence from Health Savings Experiments. (2013, neutral): “The idea of earmarking was not novel either, since many ROSCAs use spending agreements for their main pot (Gugerty 2007).”
Challenges in Banking the Rural Poor: Evidence from Kenya's Western Province (2015, neutral): “19Besley, Coate and Loury (1993), Anderson and Baland (2002) and Gugerty (2007) discuss various reasons why so many people in developing countries participate in ROSCAs. many sources as they wanted (so that the categories are not exclusive).”
The Shape of Temptation: Implications for the Economic Lives of the Poor (2010, positive): “Relatedly there is now a literature that argues that ROSCA’s should be interpreted as a way to commit to save (Gugerty (2007) and Basu (2008)).”
Does Africa Need a Rotten Kin Theorem? Experimental Evidence from Village Economies (2012, background): “(18)Gugerty (2007) surveys ROSCA participants in Busia and Teso Districts in western Kenya; she argues that the social component of ROSCA participation helps individuals overcome savings constraints.”
Mobile Banking: The Impact of M-Pesa in Kenya (2011, background): “The inability to save cash-holdings has been shown to be a constraint to fertilizer adoption in Western Kenya (Duflo et al. 2010) and promotes participation in ROSCAS which can act as a commitment saving device (Gugerty, 2007).”
Female Empowerment: Impact of a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines (2010, neutral): “Indeed, the literature on household savings, and on informal savings devices in particular, has emphasized motivations for both reasons (Anderson & Baland, 2002; Gugerty, 2007).”