Rents, Efficiency and Growth

By Mushtaq H Khan. 2000

252 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1e02a972cbca0e1ae55ba524b1f7e8c9966122c0

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Asia and Latin America (2009, background): “…of relatively passive industrial policies, a domination of rent-seeking processes by competition between emerging capitalist factions and a technology acquisition strategy that focused on low-value added, labor intensive technologies with low adaptation and co-ordination costs (Khan 2000b).”
Institutions and Policies Shaping Industrial Development: An Introductory Note (2006, background): “On the ‘perverse’ importance of rent-seeking in the development process, cf. Khan (2000a, 2000b).”
Why is corruption less harmful in some countries than in others (2009, unknown): “In accordance with the ndings of others (e.g., Hutchcroft 1994, 2000; Khan 1998, 2000; Lee 1995, 2000; Rock 1999, 2000; Wedeman 2002b), we may divide the region into three distinct groups of countries: the low corruption and high growth economies of Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore; the high…”
Determinants of Corruption in Developing Countries: The Limits of Conventional Economic Analysis (2006, background): “…growth took off, political corruption was controlled through the construction of an inclusive political coalition that allowed political stabilization through legal transfers to powerful constituencies while still allowing significant growth to happen in the productive sector (Khan 2000b: 98-101).”
The Comparative Politics of Corruption: Accounting for the East Asian Paradox in Empirical Studies of Corruption, Growth and Investment (2004, background): “As he (Khan, 2000, p. 93) also says, this process allows capitalists and landlords to seek and protect their unproductive re-distributive rents simply by expending resources on lobbying politicians and bribing bureau- crats.”
Rethinking the Relationship between Neo‐patrimonialism and Economic Development in Africa (2011, background): “According to Khan (2000b), rents are ‘excess incomes’, which in perfectly efficient markets should not exist.”
Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s: Background paper for World Economic and Social Survey 2006 (2007, background): “Secondly, even reasonably efficient markets face significant market failures in the process of organizing learning to overcome low productivity in late developers (Khan 2000b).”