Evidence on the Response of US Banks to Changes in Capital Requirements

By Craig Furfine. 2000

119 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1df216160b993c14266d328e47f2bc59600c5df5

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Citations in the corpus

Are capital buffers pro-cyclical?: Evidence from Spanish panel data (2002, background): “2 See, for example, Berger and Udell (1994), Berger (1995), Furfine (2000) and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997).”
Does bank capital affect lending behavior (2004, background): “Earlier empirical investigations concerning the effect of bank capital on lending mostly refer to the US banking system (Furfine, 2000; Hancock et al., 1995; Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Van den Heuvel, 2001b), and emphasize the importance of bank capital in influencing lending behavior.”
The cyclical behaviour of European bank capital buffers (2008, background): “Much of the work analysing the extent to which the ‘pro-cyclicality’ issue may arise with the introduction of Basel II, has however failed to consider that most banks hold capital to a large degree in excess of that required by the regulators (see for example Berger and Udell, 1994; Berger, 1995; Kw”
The Impact of Capital Requirements on Bank Lending (2014, background): “…– limited banks’ ability to make loans, although the authors are sceptical that the credit crunch played a major role in worsening the recession.3 Furfine (2000), in a theoretical model calibrated to the US data, does find a role for capital regulation in explaining the decline in loan…”
Banking Competition, Risk, and Regulation (2004, unknown): “As Furfine (2000) argues, these additional costs might involve intensified supervisory review, weakening reputation or immediacy of the need to restore the capital position either by cutting lending, asset securitisation, or trying to obtain new external capital.”
Procyclicality in Basel II: Can we treat the disease without killing the patient? (2006, background): “%) by 15% to 20%.12 It is often argued that a regulatory solvency target of 99.9% implies a rather higher solvency target in practice, as the bank must hold a buffer sufficient to avoid falling below the regulatory minimum in the event of a downturn (Furfine 2000).”