Block ownership and firm-specific information.

By P. Brockman, Xuemin Yan. 2009

240 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1c7ecb47a27d8fad46e7923ffc31faf42d27c785

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Citations in the corpus

R2 and Idiosyncratic Risk are not Interchangeable (2014, background): “Brockman and Yan (2009) examine the association between blockholders and return synchronicity.”
Blockholders and Corporate Governance (2014, unknown): “Brockman & Yan (2009) document that stocks with higher total outside block ownership contain greater firmspecific information.”
Foreign Institutional Ownership and Stock Market Liquidity: Evidence from Indonesia (2009, unknown): “, 2004; Pinnuck, 2004; Ke and Petroni, 2004; Bushee and Goodman, 2007), and large institutional ownership increases the degree of information asymmetry (e.g. Dennis and Weston, 2001; Agarwal, 2007; Rubin, 2007; Brockman and Yan, 2009) and return volatility (e.”
Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders (2011, background): “…that such blockholder trading has a permanent effect on stock prices (suggesting the price moves are due to information rather than liquidity) and Brockman and Yan (2009) find that blockholders impound firm-specific information into prices.15 After observing ṽ, each blockholder submits a market…”
The impact of bank ownership concentration on impaired loans and capital adequacy (2010, unknown): “See also Brockman and Yan (2009).”
Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Brockman and Yan (2009) document that stocks with higher total outside block ownership contain greater firm-specific information. They also recognize the importance of blockholder heterogeneity and show that this result does not hold for employee share ownership plans, which are unlikely to trade on”
Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management (2011, background): “…Hedge Funds Positive abnormal returns around filing dates, in particular when targeting the sale of the firm or change of its business strategy Brockman and Yan (2009) Blockholder ownership Blockholders decrease stock return synchronicity and increase informed trading Hill and Snell…”
Information Uncertainty, Information Asymmetry and Corporate Bond Yield Spreads (2010, background): “5 See, for example, Easley et al. (1996), Easley and O’Hara (2004), Duarte and Young (2009), Brockman and Yan (2009), Autore and Kovacs (2010), and Jiang and Zaman (2010).”
Large controlling shareholders and stock price synchronicity (2014, unknown): “Finally, unlike Brockman and Yan (2009), who conduct their study in the U.S. context, where ownership is widely dispersed and the relevant agency problem is between professional managers and all shareholders, and Gul et al. (2010), who focus on the Chinese context, where firms are typically state…”
Does stock price informativeness affect labor investment efficiency (2016, methodology): “These numbers are comparable to those reported in Brown et al. (2004). The descriptive statistics of the control variables are also comparable to related investment studies (e.”