Collateral Versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks

By M. Manove, A. Padilla, Marco Pagano. 2001

284 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1c37dcc9dee7f848d799579fdda210ff04e845be

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Citations in the corpus

Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Size UK Companies (2005, unknown): “An additional disadvantage of concentrated debt is that the bank may become “lazy” and liquidate the company prematurely (Hart (1995) and Manove et al. (2000)).”
Determinants of Non-Performing Loans: The Case of Eurozone (2014, background): “…competition increased banks’ credit risk, i.e. affecting their loan portfolios in terms of bad loan screening procedures and relaxing borrowing criteria (e.g. Michael Manove, Jorge A. Padilla, and Marco Pagano 2001; Wilko Bolt and Alexander F. Tieman 2004; Sangjun Jeong and Hueechae Jung 2013).”
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION IN A MODEL OF GROWTH THROUGH CREATIVE DESTRUCTION (2003, background): “Both the expression in square brackets in equation ( 27 ) and @k @?k are negative.”
Courts and Banks: Effects of Judicial Enforcement on Credit Markets (2005, unknown): “Less screening will increase the riskiness of their loans and the average default rate, as shown by Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001).”
Bank Competition and Credit Standards (2004, background): “The results of this article would suggest that possible collateralization leads not only to less screening [see Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001) ], but also to a change in collateral requirements over the business cycle, depending on the degree of competition among lenders.”
Measuring and Managing Credit Risk (2004, unknown): “Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001).”
Mutual guarantee institutions and small business finance (2008, unknown): “2 The consequences of guarantee requirements for the cost and availability of bank financing have been examined in numerous theo retical and empirical studies (see for example, Smith and Warner, 1979; Stulz and Johnson, 1985; Manove et al., 2000 ).”
The Political Economy of Finance (2001, background): “Finally, strong legal protection of creditor rights over collateral may reduce their incentive to screen loan applications to an inefficiently low level (Manove, Padilla, and Pagano, 2001).”