Bank Competition and Credit Standards

By Martin Ruckes. 2004

394 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/112487e91f95d094acaa1829058cdad67f7145a7

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

Booms, Busts, and Fraud (2007, positive): “Among these, the closest to our article is that of Ruckes (2004), which models how competing bank lenders' incentives to screen potential borrowers exacerbate cyclical variations in credit standards.”
How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial Crises (2013, positive): “Ruckes (2004) suggests that deposit insurance results in lax screening and lower credit standards during economic booms.”
Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market (2008, neutral): “…among asymmetrically informed banks may lead banks to behave more aggressively and take on more risks during booms than in tranquil times (e.g., Ruckes, 2004, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006, and Gorton and He, 2008).1 The subprime mortgage market provides an almost ideal ground for testing…”
Lending Booms and Lending Standards (2006, neutral): “See Ruckes (2004) for a study of lending standards as borrower quality changes.”
When arm’s length is too far. Relationship banking over the credit cycle (2015, positive): “Ruckes (2004) provides a theoretical model to explain the fluctuation of bank credit policies over the business cycle.”
Bank Risk During the Financial Crisis: Do Business Models Matter? (2011, background): “17 ECB Working Paper Series No 1394 November 2011 new geographic markets, or gain market share, loosening credit standards in the process (e.g. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Ruckes, 2004).”
Banking Competition and Capital Ratios (2007, neutral): “We include this because Ruckes (2004) illustrates that bank competition and also credit standards vary systematically with the business cycle.”
The profitability of banks in Japan (2010, neutral): “Evidence suggests that impaired loans may increase after periods of increased lending often when senior bank managers under competitive pressure to satisfy short-term profit targets imposed by owners employ less rigorous lending standards (Salas and Saurina, 2002 ; Berger and Udell, 2003 ; Ruckes,”
Does Monetary Policy Affect Bank Risk-Taking? (2010, neutral): “From a modeling perspective, this mechanism is equivalent to the impact of increased competition on lending standards (Ruckes, 2004; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006).”
Bank Credit Cycles (2008, neutral): “Two related theoretical models are provided by Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) and Ruckes (2004).”
The dynamics of US bank profitability (2015, neutral): “increase in net charge offs due to the relaxation of lending standards by bank managers responding to competitive and external governance pressures that arise as a result of shortterm profit targets set by bank owners (Berger and Udell, 2004; Ruckes, 2004).”