Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games

By Ross Cressman. 2003

569 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Mathematical Physics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1b22b8558d7b0fe488642311d04a1edd24f42f2d

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Citations in the corpus

The replicator equation and other game dynamics (2014, unknown): “either π1ðp*; p; qÞ> π1ðp; p; qÞ or π2ðq*; p; qÞ> π2ðq; p; qÞ [9]”
Accurate judgments of intention from motion cues alone: A cross-cultural study (2005, background): “…that the improved accuracy in children aged 4 and 5 reflects an improved ability to understand artificial visual displays or to understand our verbal labels for intentional actions, given that nonverbal techniques have shown that infants can attribute goals to moving objects (Csibra et al., 2003).”
α-Rank: Multi-Agent Evaluation by Evolution (2019, background): “For a detailed discussion of the concepts we refer the reader to [8, 13, 30, 31].”
Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games (2006, background): “Originally the Prisoner’s Dilemma represents those classes of two-player symmetric matrix games where the equivalent players have two choices (called cooperation (C) or defection (D)) with a specific rank of order in the four payoffs (dependent on their choices) enforcing both selfish (rational) ind”
Evolutionary games on graphs (2006, methodology): “The main results for the subtle relation between the replicator dynamics and evolutionary stability can be summarized as follows ( Hofbauer and Sigmund , 1998 ; Cressman , 2003 ; Hofbauer and Sigmund , 2003 ) Again , the converses of ( a ) and ( b ) do not necessarily hold .”
Dynamic Stability of the Replicator Equation with Continuous Strategy Space (2004, background): “Predicting the behaviors of rational individuals involved in game interactions through analyzing the stability of rest points of evolutionary dynamics is a well-accepted approach (Weibull, 1995; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Cressman, 2003), especially when the game has a finite number of strategies. ”
Neural Replicator Dynamics (2019, background): “A common way to deﬁne discrete-time replicator dynamics is according to the so-called standard discrete-time replicator dynamic [16], The action values are exponentiated to ensure all the utility values are positive, which is the typical assumption required by this model.”
Hierarchical Network Structure Promotes Dynamical Robustness (2014, background): “…1301 Morris Park Ave, Bronx, NY 10461, USA 4Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA ∗to whom correspondence should be addressed: aviv@einstein.yu.edu (Dated: December 3, 2014) The analysis of dynamical systems that attempts to model chemical reaction,…”
Evolutionary Dynamics of Biological Games (2004, background): “If fitness values depend in addition on the total population size, as is natural in many ecological contexts, then the dynamics have to be supplemented with an equation for the total population size or replaced by equations for absolute abundances ( 58 ).”