Nonbinding Voting for Shareholder Proposals

By Doron Levit, Nadya Malenko. 2011

132 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1aad9d08ad99cdb10ce750a61b0ca2192a496953

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Christopher S. Armstrong
2. David F. Larcker
3. Ian D. Gow
4. Todd A. Gormley
5. Ian R. Appel
6. Donald B. Keim
7. Stephen A. Karolyi
8. Andrew Bird

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Ian D. Gow
2. Ian R. Appel
3. Donald B. Keim
4. David F. Larcker
5. Christopher S. Armstrong
6. Todd A. Gormley
7. David A. Matsa
8. Cesare Fracassi

In Strategy and Management

1. Christopher S. Armstrong
2. David F. Larcker
3. Ian D. Gow
4. Ian R. Appel
5. Todd A. Gormley
6. Collins G. Ntim
7. David A. Wood
8. K. Hussainey

Citations in the corpus

• The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans (2012, background): “See Levit and Malenko (2011) for a more detailed discussion of the differences between the advisory nature of binding and non-binding shareholder votes.”
• Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners (2016, background): “…by shareholders through either formal (e.g., proxy voting) or informal (e.g., letters to the board) channels (Harris and Raviv (2010); Levit and Malenko (2011); Maug (1998); Shleifer and Vishny (1986)), while exit refers to the threat or actual selling of shares (Admati and…”