Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the Dynamics of Corporate Ownership
By Jean Helwege, Christo A. Pirinsky, René M. Stulz. 2007
211 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1a2bde6740fc56bee5f17af05ebde76606b24f6b
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In Accounting
- Colin Mayer
- Paolo F. Volpin
- Julian R. Franks
- Hannes F. Wagner
- Clifford G. Holderness
- Merih Sevilir
- A. Shivdasani
- Uğur Çelikyurt
Citations in the corpus
- Going Public to Acquire? The Acquisition Motive in IPOs (2010, background): “ Helwege, Pirinsky and Stulz (2007) framework illustrates that the M&A activity of IPO firms is an”
- Financial Globalization, Governance, and the Evolution of the Home Bias (2006, unknown): “To help explain this, we develop a theory—the optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias—that is based on the existence of an optimal ownership for corporations that differs across countries.”
- The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States (2009, background): “Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) report equivalent figures of 21% (14%) for a sample of several thousand NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ firms.”
- The Life Cycle of Family Ownership: International Evidence (2012, background): “Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007) find that shareholder concentration declines over time in U.S. firms following their initial public offerings (IPOs) and stocks that are more liquid tend to become widely held more quickly.”