Competition, Adverse Selection, and Information Dispersion in the Banking Industry
By Robert Marquez. 2002
452 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/19947a6cdd98c9b9722d8b9fa200e498c0983b82
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Iftekhar Hasan
- Stuart A. Fraser
- Marcello Bofondi
- Liang Han
- A. de Janvry
- E. Sadoulet
- Elena Carletti
- D. Storey
In Economics and Econometrics
- A. de Janvry
- Iftekhar Hasan
- E. Sadoulet
- Marcello Bofondi
- Liang Han
- Elena Carletti
- D. Storey
- Craig McIntosh
In Finance
- Iftekhar Hasan
- Stuart A. Fraser
- Marcello Bofondi
- Liang Han
- Elena Carletti
- D. Storey
- Craig McIntosh
- A. de Janvry
Citations in the corpus
- Multiple-bank lending: diversification and free-riding in monitoring (2004, unknown): “Proof of Proposition 9: For a given rj, each bank j chooses mij to maximize (23).”
- How Rising Competition Among Microfinance Institutions Affects Incumbent Lenders (2005, background): “Marquez (2002) highlights the fact that competition lowers the screening ability of the incumbent bank, thus increasing the share of low quality borrowers among clients.”
- CHAPTER 14 – Competition and Regulation in Banking (2008, methodology): “This is formally shown by Matutes and Vives (1996) in a model á la Diamond (1984) enriched with elements of product differentiation, network externalities and possibility of bank failures.”
- Regional growth and finance in Europe : Is there a quality effect of bank efficiency? (2009, background): “In line with casual evidence from the recent credit 16 crises, Marquez (2002) shows that increasing competition can induce banks to lend excessively to low-quality borrowers, thereby causing inefficiencies.”
- Lending Booms and Lending Standards (2006, unknown): “3 See, for example, Broecker (1990), Dell’Ariccia (2001), Marquez (2002) , and von Thadden (2001).”
- Bad Loans and Entry into Local Credit Markets (2004, background): “The exertion of market power, however, depends on the overall market structure, for which we control through the dummies Pj. 6 The choice of the market share as a proxy for information is justified by the conclusions drown by Sharpe (1990), Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999) and Marquez (2002).”