Did Securitization Affect the Cost of Corporate Debt
By Taylor D. Nadauld, Michael S. Weisbach. 2011
208 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/19937190c2f3c4e64609969aee3046e3616a0281
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
In Finance
Citations in the corpus
- Corporate Ownership Structure and the Choice Between Bank Debt and Public Debt (2013, unknown): “19 and, at the same time, banks are likely to impose stricter monitoring on borrowers with greater information opacity (e.g., Lin et al., 2012).”
- The History and Economics of Safe Assets (2016, unknown): “Nadauld & Weisbach (2012) study collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), which securitize corporate loans.”
- Syndicated Loan Spreads and the Composition of the Syndicate (2012, unknown): “…the relative spread between different facilities that depends on syndicate composition for a particular facility has to be a function of facility-level rather than firm-level 13 This approach was developed by Ivashina and Sun (2011a) and was recently adopted by Nadauld and Weisbach (2012). factors.”
- Political connections and the cost of bank loans (2014, unknown): “10 broader literature on financial contracting (e.g. Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2004; Asquith et al., 2005; Ball et al., 2008; Beatty et al., 2008; Guay, 2008; Graham et al.,, 2008; Armstrong and Guay, 2010; Costello and Wittenberg-moerman, 2011; Lin et al., 2011a,b; Campello, Lin, Ma and Zou, 2011;”
- Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China (2015, background): “…markets usually destroy firm value because controlling shareholders tend to expropriate the interests of minority shareholders, especially in countries with poor shareholder protection system (Claessens et al., 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Faccio et al., 2010; Lin et al 2012; Liu and Tian, 2012).”
- Controlling shareholder, expropriations and firm's leverage decision: Evidence from Chinese Non-tradable share reform (2012, unknown): “2 Strength of bank monitoring Previous studies indicate that bank monitoring also plays an important role in controlling shareholders’ tunneling activities, especially in firms with high excess control rights (Lin et al., 2011b; Lin et al., 2012).”