The Evolution of Animal Communication: Reliability and Deception in Signaling Systems: Reliability and Deception in Signaling Systems
By W. A. Searcy, S. Nowicki. 2005
432 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Developmental Biology, Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics, Social Psychology
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/18416fa2a3fecbd57fa73b4207df3d0686f2a315
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Citations in the corpus
- Chemosensory assessment of rival competitive ability and scent-mark function in a lizard, Podarcis hispanica (2007, background): “…provide simultaneous and inextricable information about associated costs and benefits fit into existing theoretical models concerning territory establishment (e.g. Stamps & Krishnan 2001) and honesty and deception in animal communication systems (e.g. Hurd & Enquist 2005; Searcy & Nowicki 2005).”
- Colours of quality: structural (but not pigment) coloration informs about male quality in a polychromatic lizard (2014, background): “…of the signaller (or its environment) provides informative content to many animal signals, while the costs associated with signal production, maintenance, display and/or signal cheating tend to ensure the honesty of individual quality signals (Font & Carazo, 2010; Searcy & Nowicki, 2005).”
- SONG AND MATE CHOICE IN BIRDS: HOW THE DEVELOPMENT OF BEHAVIOR HELPS US UNDERSTAND FUNCTION (2005, background): “Whether the index argument is ever the best explanation for signal reliability is a question we discuss in detail elsewhere (Searcy and Nowicki 2005).”
- Taking the sensory approach: how individual differences in sensory perception can influence mate choice (2012, neutral): “The honest signalling hypothesis predicts that only high-quality males should produce expensive signals as they are too costly for low-quality males (Searcy & Nowicki 2005).”
- Honest begging: expanding from Signal of Need (2011, background): “…there is not whether signals have any detectable cost whatever, which has been demonstrated repeatedly in terms of energetics (Chappell and Bachman 2002) and risk from predators (Haskell 2002), but ‘‘whether the costs are sufficient to enforce signal reliability’’ (Searcy and Nowicki 2005, p. 132).”
- The Evolution, Function, and Meaning of Marmot Alarm Communication (2007, background): “In these signaling systems, we should expect there to be selection on both the signaler and the receiver (Searcy and Nowicki, 2005).”
- Low-amplitude song predicts attack in a North American wood warbler (2010, background): “…be reliable, on average, because otherwise receivers would evolve to not respond to them and communication systems would break down (Johnstone & Grafen 1993; reviewed in Maynard Smith & Harper 2003; Searcy & Nowicki 2005). rganismic and Evolutionary assachusetts, Amherst, MA dy of Animal Behaviour.”
- Multiple signals for multiple messages: great tit, Parus major, song signals age and survival (2010, background): “However, only a few studies have addressed the multiple expression of birdsong, and most research in this area has been carried out in isolation (Searcy & Nowicki 2005) while taking into account one or a few song characteristics at the same time (i.e. mostly repertoire size), which has limited our…”
- Chapter 5 Vocal Performance and Sensorimotor Learning in Songbirds (2009, background): “The question of whether vocal performance provides a reliable indicator of singer quality represents an area of significant recent activity (e.g., Gil and Gahr, 2002; Searcy and Nowicki, 2005).”
- Female mate choice based upon male motor performance (2010, background): “Display vigor may also be affected by receiver-dependent costs, such as increased probability of retribution from other males, or increased exposure to predators (Searcy & Nowicki 2005).”
- Political Psychology in International Relations: Beyond the Paradigms (2018, background): “The same models of costly signaling that scholars use in IR also exist in animal game theory (Maynard-Smith & Harper 2003, Searcy & Nowicki 2005).”
- Deception as a Derived Function of Language (2016, background): “For present purposes, deception is defined here as the phenomenon where a signaller benefits from the breakdown of the normative correlation between signaller characteristic and external attribute (Searcy and Nowicki, 2005).”