When a Buyback Isn't a Buyback: Open Market Repurchases and Employee Options

By Kathleen M. Kahle. 2002

557 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/181fc63ed271477cdb7a33da602ec61881a9c597

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Citations in the corpus

Errors in Estimating Share Repurchases (2008, unknown): “(2003) and Kahle (2002), actual repurchases are higher in firms with greater option use (results not tabulated) and as predicted, the increased motive to reissue common stock decreases the accuracy of the repurchase estimates.”
Can Managers Time the Market? Evidence Using Repurchase Price Data (2015, background): “3 Though Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008) provide summary statistics of the amount repurchased by a random sample of 520 firms in 2004 using these data (to determine the accuracy of previously used measures of the quantity of stock repurchased), no other paper utilizes data on both the amount and price ”
Do Managers Intentionally Use Repurchase Tender Offers to Signal Private Information? Evidence from Firm Financial Reporting Behavior (2007, background): “financial leverage (Dittmar, 2000), reduction of agency costs (Denis and Denis, 1993; Grullon and Michaely, 2004), financing of employee stock option plans ( Kahle, 2002 ), expropriation of creditors (Maxwell and Stephens, 2003), earnings management (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000), and maximization of”
The Nature and Persistence of Buyback Anomalies (2009, background): “(Kahle, 2002) 6.”
Share Repurchases as a Potential Tool to Mislead Investors (2010, unknown): “We see that, generally speaking, holdings increase significantly after a buyback announcement, a result consistent with findings by Weisbenner (2000), Kahle (2002), and others who argue that managers may use buybacks to manage share “dilution” from the exercise of vested option holdings.”
Global leverage adjustments, uncertainty, and country institutional strength (2018, background): “Uncertainty could lead to slower leverage adjustments by affecting firm employees’ decisions to exercise their executive options, which are in turn closely tied to the firm’s equity retirement decision (e.g., Kahle, 2002).”
Payout Policy Choices and Shareholder Investment Horizons (2013, methodology): “We compute from ExecuComp the average level of managerial ownership and the average percentage of executive compensation paid in the form of options, to control for the influence of compensation in payout choices (e.g. Dittmar, 2000; Fenn and Liang, 2001; Kahle, 2002).”
The Real Effects of Share Repurchases (2016, background): “, 1995; Brockman and Chung, 2001; Peyer and Vermaelen, 2007), when they lack future growth opportunities (Grullon and Michaely, 2004), to signal strong future performance (Lie, 2005), to boost employee incentives (Babenko, 2009), to mitigate the dilutive effect of stock option exercises (Kahle, 2002”
Executive Financial Incentives and Payout Policy: Firm Responses to the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut (2007, unknown): “Table I reports summary statistics for our sample in 2002 and 2003.”
The timing of financing decisions: An examination of the correlation in financing waves (2008, background): “Fenn and Liang (2001) and Kahle (2002) show that the increased use of stock options impacts the use of stock repurchases.”
Economic Sources of Gain in Stock Repurchases (2004, background): “Mikkelson and Partch (1988) and Clarke, Dunbar, and Kahle (2001) find evidence consistent with the mispricing hypothesis when considering equity offerings that were subsequently withdrawn.”
Employee Stock Options, EPS Dilution, and Stock Repurchases (2003, background): “6 billion in 1996 (Dittmar, 2000; Kahle, 2001).”