Do Managers Intentionally Use Repurchase Tender Offers to Signal Private Information? Evidence from Firm Financial Reporting Behavior

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The risk-reward nexus in the innovation-inequality relationship: who takes the risks? Who gets the rewards? (2013, background): “Executives often claim that buybacks are financial investments that signal confidence in the company’s future as measured by its stock-price performance (Vermaelen, 2005, ch. 3; Louis and White, 2007).”
Do More Reputable Financial Institutions Reduce Earnings Management by IPO Issuers (2011, methodology): “Following the extant literature (Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b; Louis, 2004; Louis and White, 2007; Gong et al. , 2008a, 2008b, Louis et al., 2008), we proxy for EM by the level of a firm’s abnormal accruals using the residual from a modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model.”
Managerial Ability and Income Smoothing (2019, unknown): “…examining the usefulness of smoothing and, more broadly, to the literature on the use of financial reporting to communicate managers’ private information (Subramanyam 1996; Demski 1998; Louis and Robinson 2005; Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Louis and White 2007; Badertscher, Collins, and Lys 2012).”
The Effects of Firm Growth and Model Specification Choices on Tests of Earnings Management in Quarterly Settings (2017, result): “Thus, consistent with the prior findings of Rangan (1998), there does appear to be some upward earnings management associated with SEOs, although the degree of upward management appears to be less than previously documented.”