Dominant institutional owners and firm value
By M. V. Ruiz-Mallorquí, D. J. Santana‐Martín. 2011
138 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1758b6a9a787a9d39985d885c5b13db18982de43
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In Accounting
Citations in the corpus
- The effectiveness of internal corporate governance and audit quality: the role of ownership concentration – Malaysian evidence (2018, background): “However, major outsider shareholders are characterised by high levels of participation, with representatives on the board of directors, enabling them to control the actions of managers and prevent the expropriation of minority interests (Mitton, 2002; Ruiz-Mallorqui and Santana-Martin, 2011; Shleife”
- CEO Compensation, Family Control and Institutional Investors in Continental Europe (2012, unknown): “investors, and in particular, those of foreign institutional investors, has recently grown considerably (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2011).”
- Government ownership and corporate governance: Evidence from the EU. (2012, unknown): “However, Cornett et al. (2007) and Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín (2011) show benefits accrue to firms with higher (or dominant) institutional ownership only when monitoring by these owners is not weakened by strong business ties to the firms.”