Agency Costs of Controlling Minority Shareholders

By Henrik Cronqvist, Mattias Nilsson. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2003

712 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/16ad51b0a345e9d4e9e5eb3eeeb1ab86716182f7

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Institutional Investors and Institutional Environment: A Comparative Analysis and Review (2010, background): “The family owners control managers through the two-tiered ownership structures where family members have voting rights and minority shareholders have less voting power or none at all (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003).”
Corporate Governance and the Home Bias (2003, methodology): “The original data come from SIS Agarservice and corporations' own company charts or web pages, and were initially collected by Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) who study agency costs of controlling minority”
Incentive and entrenchment effects in European ownership (2009, background): “Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) analyze the impact of controlling minority shareholders on firm value and firm performance in a sample of 309 publicly traded Swedish firms.”
Family control and the implied cost of equity: Evidence before and after the Asian financial crisis (2010, background): “For instance, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) find that, among controlling shareholders, families in Sweden are associated with significant firm-value discounts, and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) find that familycontrolled firms avoid issue methods that dilute”
Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Value: Evidence from Thailand (2001, background): “Besides Cronqvist and Nilsson (2000), most studies employ ownership cut-off points at 5, 10 and 20 percent, or use the Herfindhal index in measuring ownership concentration.”
Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China (2015, background): “The last characteristic of Chinese family firms is that controlling families are deeply involved in everyday management which causes more critical agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders and harms firm value (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003).”
How Do Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value? (2006, positive): “(2002), the Swedish economy in Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003), or the emerging markets in Lins (2003).”
The Choice Between Rights Offerings and Private Equity Placements (2005, background): “The value of control benefits in these countries is often significant (see, e.g., Dyck and Zingales (2004), Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003), and Nenova (2003)).”