Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium
By Akira Okada. 2011
273 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/162e6b7fc40039feda32a2eefad393638a15f919
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Yawen Jiao
- Subramanian Ramamoorthy
- Kay-Yut Chen
- Ö. Özer
- Stefano V. Albrecht
- Krishnan S. Anand
- Pierpaolo Battigalli
- Amanda Friedenberg
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Stefano V. Albrecht
- Yawen Jiao
- Subramanian Ramamoorthy
- Kay-Yut Chen
- Ö. Özer
- Krishnan S. Anand
- Pierpaolo Battigalli
- Amanda Friedenberg
In Safety Research
- Yawen Jiao
- Subramanian Ramamoorthy
- Kay-Yut Chen
- Ö. Özer
- Stefano V. Albrecht
- Krishnan S. Anand
- Pierpaolo Battigalli
- Amanda Friedenberg
Citations in the corpus
- Strategic Information Management Under Leakage in a Supply Chain (2009, methodology): “Since this is a dynamic (multi-stage) supply chain game under incomplete information among a supplier and two downstream competitors, we derive and analyze the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria (PBNE) (cf Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991a.)4 in terms of the information and material flows in this setting.”
- Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships (2012, unknown): “Following a large strand of the literature, I thus focus on a subset of these equilibria by placing restrictions on what parties can do in every contingency.”
- Dual class IPOs: A theoretical analysis (2012, background): “See Field and Karpoff (2002) for a detailed listing. tions related to antitakeover provisions: What are the costs and benefits of incorporating various antitakeover provisions in a firm’s charter?”
- A game-theoretic model and best-response learning method for ad hoc coordination in multiagent systems (2013, background): “However, the crucial aspect of (4) is that it defines a sum rather than a product, which means that the problems described above do not occur.”
- Forward induction reasoning revisited (2012, methodology): “(The idea dates back to Hammond 1987 and is related to the “do not signal what you do not know” condition of Fudenberg and Tirole 1991.”
- Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict (2010, background): “Multipleround games of asymmetric information have been described by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).”
- Trust in Forecast Information Sharing (2011, methodology): “To obtain a solution, we employ the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE; see Fudenberg and Tirole 1991).”