The effect of organizational form on quality: the case of franchising
By Steven C. Michael. 2000
223 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1586de13d8357f2abbd7eaa3134019141096794a
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
In Strategy and Management
- James G. Combs
- Dave J. Ketchen
- Thomas Ehrmann
- Olivier Cochet
- Julian Dormann
- Joey F. George
- D. Harrison McKnight
- Michael H. Dickey
Citations in the corpus
- Capitalizing on Franchisee Autonomy: Relational Forms of Governance as Controls in Idiosyncratic Franchise Dyads* (2008, background): “The observation that theoretically derived predictions about opportunistic action in franchising translate into empirical facts (for example, Michael 2000) suggests that relational norms (but also formal controls) cannot perfectly enforce cooperative behavior.”
- The role of trust in franchise organizations (2008, background): “On average, franchise organizations deliver poorer product quality ( Michael, 2000”
- Entrepreneurial Failure: The Case of Franchisees* (2008, background): “In franchising, geographic dispersion and the need for local knowledge in decision-making increase the costs of observing the quality of local managers (Michael 2000; Rubin 1978).”
- Why Do Firms Use Franchising as an Entrepreneurial Strategy?: A Meta-Analysis (2003, background): “…inputs restricted by the franchisor (i.e., franchisee purchasing discretion) Low Bercovitz (1999) Dummy variable= 1 if experience required Low Michael (2000b) Employees/outlet Low Michael (1996a) Labor cost/sales Low Michael (1996a) Outlet capital investment/number of employeesc Low Scott…”