Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modeling

By Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin. NBER macroeconomics annual, 2000

428 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1582e25e15be809f1b2c4731907654c027bdd6d1

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Citations in the corpus

Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises (2014, neutral): “The first part of the Proof follows roughly the same lines as in Morris and Shin (2000).”
Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games (2003, background): “The following argument follows Morris and Shin (2001a).”
Curbing the Credit Cycle (2015, neutral): “For a survey of coordination games in macroeconomics, see Cooper (1999) and Morris and Shin (2000).”
A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements (2007, methodology): “Morris and Shin (2000) have shown that when ε > 0, there is a unique rationalizable action: No Attack when xi < x̄ (ε, y) and Attack when xi > x̄ (ε, y) where x̄ (ε, y) is a decreasing function of y, approaching 1 as y → −∞ and 0 as y → ∞.”
Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises + (2012, methodology): “Morris and Shin (1998) also use the global games modeling technique to model a coordination game in which each player’s payoff depends on his own action and the actions of others, as well as unknown economic fundamentals.”
Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research (2016, background): “As Morris and Shin ( 2001 ) argue , these indeterminacies arise from assuming that economic fundamentals are common knowledge and that individuals are certain of the behavior of others in equilibrium .”
Global Games: Theory and Applications (2003, background): “We have argued elsewhere (Morris and Shin, 2000) that the apparent indeterminacy of beliefs in many models with multiple equilibria can be seen as the consequence of two modeling assumptions introduced to simplify the theory.”
Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All? (2002, background): “See also Morris and Shin (2000).”