CEO Overconfidence and Dividend Policy

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Overconfidence and investment: An experimental approach (2017, background): “The fact that overconfident CEOs prefer less control from the providers of outside funding which leads them to hoard cash is also reflected in their payout policy: they retain more cash and pay less dividends (Deshmukh et al. (2013)).”
Can Strong Boards and Trading Their Own Firm’s Stock Help CEOs Make Better Decisions? Evidence from Acquisitions by Overconfident CEOs (2013, background): “7See Deshmukh, Goel, and Howe (2013), Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson (2002), Hribar and Yang (2010), and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2007).”
Corporate social responsibility and CEO confidence (2017, neutral): “Recent research also shows that some personal traits of managers impact upon corporate policies, including hedging (Ben-David et al., 2013 and Deshmukh et al., 2013).”
Restraining Overconfident CEOs through Improved Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2015, positive): “This is consistent with the findings documented in Deshmukh et al. (2013) that overconfident CEOs prefer to limit dividend payments.”