RFID Systems and Security and Privacy Implications

By Sanjay E. Sarma, Stephen A. Weis, Daniel W. Engels. Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2002

719 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Media Technology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/14874ebc28f05718f63468868771d626744b1195

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Citations in the corpus

Picking Virtual Pockets using Relay Attacks on Contactless Smartcard (2005, background): “[44] and [35] offer a “Hash-Lock” approach to low cost RFID devices which use a “lock/unlock” mechanism to protect against retrieving the RFID ID number.”
A Lightweight RFID Protocol to protect against Traceability and Cloning attacks (2005, methodology): “During normal operation, the tag is singularized by any standard method like binary tree-walking or any other anti-collision protocol [13].”
Strong Authentication for RFID Systems Using the AES Algorithm (2004, background): “10 [15] for simple identification tags and a little bit higher for security-enhanced tags.”
Contact Tracing Mobile Apps for COVID-19: Privacy Considerations and Related Trade-offs (2020, background): “We also do not discuss appropriate selection of token refresh interval and frequency at which phones should poll for nearby ones, which are important factors for balancing privacy and efﬁciency—stale IDs have been seen to permit linkage attacks in other similar contexts [44].”
Security and Privacy in Radio-Frequency Identification Devices (2003, background): “The hash lock scheme also appears in [91] and [108] by the author.”
Authenticating Pervasive Devices with Human Protocols (2005, background): “Rather than sharing a single k-bit random secret x, the tag and reader now share an additional k-bit random secret y. Unlike the case in the HB protocol, the tag in the HB+ protocol first generates random k-bit “blinding” vector b and sends it to the reader.”
"Yoking-proofs" for RFID tags (2004, positive): “We suggest that such proofs are a useful tool for maintaining integrity in supply chains, particularly as RFID data will commonly flow across multiple, loosely affiliated organizations.”
EMAP: An Efficient Mutual-Authentication Protocol for Low-Cost RFID Tags (2006, background): “all [9] in 2002, most of the proposed solutions [1,2,15] are based on the use of hash functions.”
Universal Re-encryption for Mixnets (2004, background): “RFID tags have very limited processing ability (insu‐cient to perform any re-encryption of data), but they allow devices to read and write to their memory [15, 16 ].”
RFID security and privacy: a research survey (2006, background): “…identifiers be suppressed, or that they change over time. c) Relabeling: Sarma, Weis, and Engels (SWE) propose the idea of effacing unique identifiers in tags at the point of sale [60] to address the tracking problem, but retaining product-type identifiers (traditional barcode data) for later use.”
Minimalist Cryptography for Low-Cost RFID Tags (2004, background): “Researchers have recognized this problem for some time [21, 35], and have yet to propose a truly satisfactory remedy.”
A scalable and provably secure hash-based RFID protocol (2005, background): “Unfortunately, only few protocols of the latter category are secure (see [1, 2]).”