Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design

By Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Edward J. Kane, Luc Laeven. 2006

241 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b43ef01ad3677545044bd0e986403fd3bff41218

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Citations in the corpus

How Does Bank Competition Affect Systemic Stability (2012, unknown): “6 See Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009), Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009), Chan-Lau and Gravelle (2005), Avesani, Pascual, and Li (2006), and Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2005).”
Institutional development and bank stability: Evidence from transition countries (2014, methodology): “Deposit insurance =1 when the country has explicit deposit insurance of when depositors were fully compensated the last time a bank failed if the country did not have formal deposit insurance Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2007)”
Firm lobbying and influence in developing countries: a multilevel approach (2012, methodology): “2008), banking sector regulations (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2008), bribes (Martin et al.”
How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the Recent Crisis (2012, background): “Consistent with this view, Gropp and Vesala (2004) show that the adoption of deposit insurance is associated with lower bank risk in the European Union.”
Deposit Insurance and Bank Risk-Taking : Evidence from Internal Loan Ratings (2008, unknown): “…number of recent papers have been emphasizing the role of private interest groups on the design of deposit insurance systems around the world (see, Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2007) and Laeven (2004) for crosscountry evidence, and Kroszner and Strahan (2001) for voting behavior in the U.S.…”
Why do some banks contribute more to global systemic risk? (2018, methodology): “On the other hand, following the classic result of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, the existence of deposit insurance should prevent bank runs and thus reduce systemic risk. To further characterize the moral hazard problem induced by the presence of deposit insurance, we also employ in our regr”
Working Paper # 0001 January 5 , 2012 A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics (2012, unknown): “These issues appear repeatedly in the literature, including recent papers by Kapadia, Drehmann, Elliott, and Sterne (2009) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen”
Corruption and bank risk-taking: Evidence from emerging economies (2015, unknown): “The data of explicit deposit insurance is from Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2007). 19”
Does Deposit Insurance Improve Financial Intermediation? Evidence from the Russian Experiment (2011, background): “1 See, for example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Chari and Jagannathan (1988),”