Enforcement, Private Political Pressure, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Escape Clause

By K. Bagwell, R. Staiger. The Journal of Legal Studies, 2005

118 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1424657697c1a85d4ec5c05101f9bcbf456764bb

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Manuel Amador
2. Anna Maria Mayda
3. Rodney D. Ludema
4. K. Bagwell
5. R. Staiger
6. Henrik Horn
7. G. Maggi
8. C. Bown

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Manuel Amador
2. Anna Maria Mayda
3. Rodney D. Ludema
4. K. Bagwell
5. R. Staiger
6. G. Maggi
7. Henrik Horn
8. C. Bown

Citations in the corpus

• Is the WTO Passé (2015, unknown): “147See also Bagwell and Staiger (2005b).”
• Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts (2010, result): “We also note that the explanation proposed here is closely related to the one proposed in Bagwell and Staiger (2005), where weak bindings may be preferred to strong bindings in the presence of politicaleconomy shocks that are privately observed by governments.”
• Tariff binding and overhang: Theory and evidence (2015, unknown): “Our theoretical model builds on Bagwell and Staiger (2005), who show that a tariff binding arrangement that allows countries to reduce tariffs below the binding is preferred to an inflexible binding when countries have private information about their demand for protection.4 Amador and Bagwell…”
• A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements (2007, unknown): “Bagwell and Staiger (2005) propose a model where tariff ceilings are motivated by the presence of privately observed shocks in the political pressures faced by governments.”
• The Theory of Optimal Delegation With an Application to Tariff Caps (2013, methodology): “12See Bagwell and Staiger (2010) for a recent survey of this literature.”
• Do terms-of-trade effects matter for trade agreements? Theory and evidence from WTO Countries* (2013, background): “Second, while our theoretical model makes no distinction between bound and applied rates, Bagwell and Staiger (2005) provide a theory that accounts for the difference, based on private information about political pressure.22 In their model, the bound rate is chosen to ensure the incentive…”