Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts
By Henrik Horn, G. Maggi, R. Staiger. 2010
241 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/42ecdebe9a9cf5d4a4b271b266fbe018b4275f90
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Emanuel Ornelas
- Caroline Freund
- A. Estevadeordal
- C. Bown
- John S. Wilson
- George R. G. Clarke
- Scott Wallsten
- Alberto Portugal-Perez
Citations in the corpus
- Tariff binding and overhang: Theory and evidence (2015, unknown): “Horn et al. (2010) show that at the presence of contracting costs, instead of writing a fully contingent agreement it may be optimal to specify tariff bindings to save on contracting costs.”
- Does regionalism affect trade liberalization towards non-members? (2008, background): “If renegotiation is costly, as it likely is (see for example the discussion in Horn et al. [2006]), then this suggests a specific timing in the determination of tariffs, where”