The Economic Effects of Constitutions
By Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini. 2003
820 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/137a366964fb8e65919e5bc7f06601356ea652cb
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- A. Alesina
- Toke S. Aidt
- Daron Acemoglu
- James A. Robinson
- Antonio Fatás
- I. Mihov
- Thierry Verdier
- Torsten Persson
Citations in the corpus
- Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline? (2006, neutral): “Thus, Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) examine the influence of electoral rules but not of budget institutions; Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) analyze government fragmentation and ideologies, as well as fiscal institutions, but do not consider electoral rules.”
- Is the Welfare State Sustainable? Experimental Evidence on Citizens' Preferences for Redistribution (2010, neutral): “Persson and Tabellini (2003) find supporting empirical evidence in that countries with proportional representation have GDP shares of government expenditure that ceteris paribus are 5 percentage points higher than countries with majority rule.”
- Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's The Economic Effects of Constitutions (2005, methodology): “TABLE 3 COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND CONSTITUTIONS: SECOND STAGE INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATES Persson and Tabellini (2003) Sample Cross-Section 2SLS (1) (2) (3) (4) Dependent Variable is Central Government Expenditure on Social Services and Welfare as % GDP PRES 0.296 0.527 0.615 1.585…”
- Regulation of Entry and the Distortion of Industrial Organization (2010, background): “Persson and Tabellini (2003) and others have argued that these variables significantly impact both the size of government, as well as the extent to which governments intervene in the economy.”
- Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Resource Abundance, Dependence and the Onset of Civil Wars (2009, background): “…and find that its coefficient more than doubles in size after instrumenting, but decide to ignore it in their core specification as it does not qualitatively affect their other main variables of interest.. 12 This argument is based on seminal contributions by Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004).”
- How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries (2008, background): “The decision whether the prime minister or the president is the leader is based on the DPI dataset classification, as described in Persson and Tabellini (2003).”
- Quantiles via moments (2019, methodology): “Persson and Tabellini (2003) use data from 1960 to 1998 for 58 countries to estimate the relation between the surplus of the central government in percent of GDP (denoted SPL) and the following set of country characteristics: POLITY, the measure of the quality of democracy developed by Eckstein and…”