DO COUNTRIES DEFAULT IN “BAD TIMES”?

By Michael Tomz, Mark L. J. Wright. 2007

286 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/12a78d7cdf86b77b30796934e91100e1f252594d

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. J. Hatchondo
2. Leonardo Martinez
3. Christoph Trebesch
4. Mark L. J. Wright
5. T. Asonuma
6. Michael Tomz

In Finance

1. J. Hatchondo
2. Leonardo Martinez
3. Christoph Trebesch
4. Mark L. J. Wright
5. Michael Tomz
6. T. Asonuma
7. Adrien Auclert
8. Francisco Roch

Citations in the corpus

• Recovery Before Redemption: A Theory of Delays in Sovereign Debt Renegotiations (2009, unknown): “[27] Tomz, Michael and Mark L.”
• Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Preemptive or Post-Default (2015, background): “In the literature, debt crises are typically modeled as discrete events in which a country either pays back or defaults on 100% of the debt (e.g. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Tomz and Wright (2007) or Arellano (2008), see also the survey by Aguiar and Amador (2014)).”
• Long-Duration Bonds and Sovereign Defaults (Revised July 2009) (2009, methodology): “Tomz and Wright (2007) document that the correlation between default decisions and output levels is negative but moderate.”
• Financial Crises: Explanations, Types, and Implications (2013, unknown): “Notably, countries do not always default when times are bad, as most models predict: Tomz and Wright (2007) report that in only 62 percent of defaults cases output was below trend.”
• Heterogeneous Borrowers in Quantitative Models of Sovereign Default (2009, unknown): “ Tomz and Wright (2007) report that even though most default episodes”
• Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default (2013, background): “Our data, which extend the work of Tomz and Wright (2007), cover 176 sovereign entities (counting countries and their historical counterparts as separate entities) from 1820 to the present.5 The sovereigns were in existence for a total of 17,202 country-years.”
• Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk (2011, unknown): “Bolton and Jeanne (2009) also argue that sovereigns willingness to repay has many other determinants besides domestic GDP. Tomz and Wright (2007) show that these other determinants play an important role as predictors of sovereign defaults.”
• Financial Integration and International Risk Sharing (2006, unknown): “Tomz and Wright (2006)[32] reports that output is below trend about 1.”
• Political risk spreads (2014, unknown): “6Yet Tomz and Wright (2007), using data for the period 1820–2004, find only weak correlation between economic output in the borrowing country and sovereign defaults.”