Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Theory and Evidence
By Deirdre Bird, Marcel Fafchamps. 2004
454 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Information Systems
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/11f15b6fbeca30e9bb0f033b82b6fe013d1dd311
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In Information Systems
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Citations in the corpus
- Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange (2005, unknown): “But because designed CEIs intentional, they often have features similar to those of public-order institutions, such formal procedures to resolve disputes and impose fines.”
- Can Public–Private Partnerships Leverage Private Investment in Agricultural Value Chains in Africa? A Preliminary Review (2012, background): “Kherallah, Delgado, Gabre-Madhin, Minot, and Johnson (2000) and Fafchamps (2004) argue that important institutions required to support efficient private markets have not been established.”
- On the Structural Transformation of Rural Africa (2017, background): “But the traditional input systems that supply them and the value chains that evacuate, aggregate, process and distribute their harvests are demonstrably inefficient (Fafchamps 2004; Reardon et al. 2009; Brenton 2012).”
- ‘I Don’t Trust the Phone; It Always Lies’ (2007, background): “…are considered to be incapable of reaping the beneªts of joint action, because they are distracted by issues of establishing and maintaining trust (Parker 1994; Barr 1999; McCormick 1999b; Pedersen 1999; Ishi-hara 2003; Fafchamps 2004), particularly trust over money and cash (Lyons & Snoxell 2005).”
- Exploring double side-selling in cooperatives, case study of four coffee cooperatives in Rwanda (2013, background): “In the context of contract farming side-selling or leakage is usually explained as a way in which farmers avoid paying for subsidies they received (Fafchamps, 2004; Bellemare, 2010).”
- Matching and network effects (2010, unknown): “Informal institutions have been empirically studied extensively in economics and other subjects; see e.g., Granovetter (1985), Greif (2001), Munshi (2003), Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006), North (2001), Fafchamps and Lund (2003) and Fafchamps (2004).”
- Climate Change, Global Food Security, and the U.S. Food System (2015, background): “Exchange is difficult to monitor in small markets that do not participate in international commodity trading (Fafchamps 2004).”
- Agrifood Industry Transformation and Small Farmers in Developing Countries (2009, background): “The context of the analysis also evolved with the onset of structural adjustment in the 1980s, which reduced or eliminated public support systems that had partially assured the existence of some markets that after went missing, such as public credit (Hoff et al. 1993, Jaffee, 1995, Fafchamps, 2004).”
- The formation of risk sharing networks (2007, background): “Fafchamps (2004) and Fisman (2003) have shown that prior acquaintance plays a paramount role in market exchange in African manufacturing because it forms the basis for trust.”
- Smallholder participation in contract farming: Comparative evidence from five countries (2012, background): “But this strategy often bypassed smallholder households because (i) market segmentation impeded price transmission, which in turn distorted incentives and prevented the successful uptake of arbitrage opportunities (Barrett, 2008); (ii) macroeconomic and sectoral approaches ignored the many market fa”