Corporate policies restricting trading by insiders

By J. Bettis, J. Coles, Michael L. Lemmon. 2000

474 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1189442deabad4eb91ea64b32cd9707ef4de3b10

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Citations in the corpus

On Guidance and Volatility (2015, background): “This 15-day window corresponds to the period of time when Bettis et al. (2000) find that managers are typically not restricted in trading shares of their firm’s stock.”
Opportunism as a Firm and Managerial Trait: Predicting Insider Trading Profits and Misconduct (2017, background): “5 Bettis et al. (2000) also find that on average blackout period trades are less profitable during 1992-7.”
Serial Acquirer Bidding: An Empirical Test of the Learning Hypothesis (2011, background): “Moreover, insider trading exhibits seasonality, perhaps due to restrictions imposed by the company (Bettis et al., 2000).”
Paper millionaires: how valuable is stock to a stockholder who is restricted from selling it? ☆ (2001, unknown): “Rule 144 prohibits an affiliate from selling restricted control stock for one year after the stock is acquired.”
Executive Stock Options, Differential Risk-Taking Incentives, and Firm Value (2012, background): “Finally, Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) find that a majority of the firms in their sample have policies restricting insider trading.”
Ownership Level, Ownership Concentration and Liquidity (2007, unknown): “1 Evidence of insiders’ information superiority includes Jaffe (1974), Lin and Howe (1990), Bettis et al. (2000), and Lakonishok and Lee (2001).”
Corporate governance and the profitability of insider trading (2016, methodology): “We include IT-Policy and G-Counsel in the regression to control for previously documented effects of these ITPs on the profitability of insider trading (Bettis et al., 2000; Jagolinzer et al., 2011).”
The Walk-down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives* (2004, unknown): “Bettis et al. reported that firms increasingly instituted formal blackout periods during the 1990s, and that by 1997, 80 percent of firms had blackout periods.4 Therefore, the occurrence of insiders’ option exercises and stock sales are increasingly focused in a narrow window immediately after an ea”
What Insiders Know About Future Earnings and How They Use it: Evidence from Insider Trades (2003, unknown): “(7)Bettis et al. (2000) and Roulstone (2003) describe corporate policies restricting trade by insiders.”