Tournament Rewards and Risk Taking

By Hans K. Hvide. Journal of Labor Economics, 2002

272 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment (2010, unknown): “We will not especulate as to the actual form that these psychological differences may take beyond indicating that they may be associated with mechanisms such as increased arousal, greater shifting of mental process from “automatic” to “controlled,” or differences in the narrowing of attention (see A”
Rankings and Risk-Taking in the Finance Industry (2018, unknown): “This result is in line with the literature arguing that tournament incentives increase risk-taking (Hvide (2002), Rajan (2006), Kleinlercher et al. (2014)).”
Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital Markets: A Review and Synthesis (2003, background): “Several papers pursue these and related issues such as optimal contracting in detail (see, e.g., Maug and Naik, 1996; Gumbel, 1998; Huddart, 1999; Hvide, 2001).”
Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts (2011, unknown): “To reduce potential inefficiencies induced by unequal contests (such as shirking and suboptimal risk choices), RPE firms need to identify peers exhibiting similar ability as the firms (e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1981; Hvide 2002).”