Information, Contracting, and Quality Costs

By Stanley Baiman, Paul E. Fischer, Madhav V. Rajan. 2000

372 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Information Systems, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1062c6a55575e9e75f359f810b010c47dcd78872

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Citations in the corpus

Cost-sharing mechanism for product quality improvement in a supply chain under competition (2019, background): “Considering a ”riskneutral settings”, Baiman et al. (2000) analyzed the relationship among product quality, the cost of quality, and the information that can be contracted on. Lim (2001) extended Reyniers and Tapiero (1995)’s work by considering a supply chain with incomplete information. Then, Sing”
The Interplay between Information Acquisition and Quality Disclosure (2017, background): “Here, d represents the manufacturer’s cost of effort on quality enhancement and such a convex cost function C ( k ) is widely adopted in the related literature (Baiman et al. 2000). q (cid”
Quality Improvement Incentives and Product Recall Cost Sharing Contracts (2009, background): “Baiman et al. (2000) analyze the relationship between product quality, cost of quality, and the information that can be contracted on.”
Mitigating Incentive Conflicts in Inter-Firm Relationships: Evidence from Long-Term Supply Contracts (2013, background): “5 Consistent with this, Baiman et al. [2000] model a double moral hazard problem in supply contracting and show that the information available for contracting impacts the quality of the good exchanged.”
Managing Disruptions in Decentralized Supply Chains with Endogenous Supply Process Reliability (2014, methodology): “Both Equations (7) and (11) suggest that when subsidy is not used, the buyer’s order quantity from each supplier increases to a level above d if w is low.”
Supply Disruptions, Asymmetric Information, and a Backup Production Option (2009, background): “For instance, Baiman et al. (2000) study a moral hazard issue surrounding the fact that both the supplier and the manufacturer can exert costly effort to prevent (requiring supplier effort) or weed out defective items.”