Regulation FD and the Financial Information Environment: Early Evidence
By Frank Heflin, K. Subramanyam, Y. Zhang. 2003
519 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0ffd7e96f625747681b6a04ad0a0cc902293e8b8
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Peter D. Wysocki
- Christian Leuz
- Luzi Hail
- Hans B. Christensen
- I. Wang
- Shyam V. Sunder
- Michael B. Clement
- James Vincent
In Finance
- Christian Leuz
- Peter D. Wysocki
- Luzi Hail
- Hans B. Christensen
- I. Wang
- Shyam V. Sunder
- Michael B. Clement
- Senyo Tse
In Strategy and Management
- Christian Leuz
- Peter D. Wysocki
- Luzi Hail
- Hans B. Christensen
- Shyam V. Sunder
- Michael B. Clement
- I. Wang
- Senyo Tse
Citations in the corpus
- Do Analysts Practice What They Preach and Should Investors Listen? Effects of Recent Regulations (2009, unknown): “For example, Gimein (2002) claims that investment advice offered by analysts is ‘‘so dishonest and fraught with conflicts of interest that it has become worthless’’ (see also Heflin et al. 2003 ).”
- Analyst following along the supply chain (2011, unknown): “…(Brown et al.1987; Kross et al. 1990; Lang and Lundholm 1996), an analyst’s ability and skills (Clement 1999; Mikhail et al. 1997; Clement et al. 2007; Bae et al. 2008), government regulation (Heflin et al. 2003), and an analyst’s portfolio choices (Clement 1999; Kini et al. 2009; Sonney 2009).”
- The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research (2015, background): “Similarly, there is evidence that firms increase earnings guidance after Reg FD, for example, to compensate the loss in analyst coverage (Heflin et al., 2003; Gomes et al., 2007; Anantharaman and Zhang, 2011).”
- How Has Regulation FD Affected the Operations of Financial Analysts (2006, methodology): “These results are also broadly consistent with those of Heflin et al. 2003, who document a univariate decline in forecast accuracy that becomes insignificant after they control for macroeconomic effects.”
- Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regulation: Prior Conditions, Implementation, and Enforcement (2016, background): “But it also holds for many studies on Regulation Fair Disclosure (e.g., Heflin, Subramanyam, and Zhang 2003; Gintschel and Markov 2004; Francis, Nanda, and Wang 2006) and the Sarbanes- Oxley Act (e.g., Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2007; Zhang 2007; Li, Pincus, and Rego 2008; Doidge, Karolyi, and…”
- Managerial and Investor Responses to Disclosure Regulation: The Case of Reg Fd and Conference Calls (2004, unknown): “Shane et al. (2001) and Bailey et al. (2003) find no increase in stock price volatility; Shane et al. (2001) and Heflin et al. (2003) find no increase in analyst forecast accuracy; and Eleswarapu 620 Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller”
- Re-Examining the Effects of Regulation Fair Disclosure using Foreign Listed Firms to Control for Concurrent Shocks (2006, unknown): “Event returns volatility (around earnings announcements): Following HSZ [2003b], we use the sum of daily squared abnormal returns as our measure of event returns volatility around firm j’s quarter q earnings announcement, 1 2 , , 1 ( 1, 1) j q t SqrCAR AR + =− − + = ∑ j t , where 2,j tAR = firm j’s ”